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RECENT DECISIONS
CIVIL PROCEDURE-Manufactured Diversity-The appoint-
ment of an administrator c.t.a. of an estate for the purpose of ob-
taining federal diversity jurisdiction is "improper" or "collusive"
-within the meaning of section 1359 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. O'Bqien v. AVCO Corp. (2d Cir. 1969).
In 1965, all passengers of a small airplane owned by the Paul
G. Badgley Company of New York were killed when the plane
crashed en route to Cleveland, Ohio. Two years later, Mrs. Barch,
the wife of one of the deceased passengers, in her capacity as
executrix of her husband's estate, instituted a wrongful death ac-
tion in the New York County Supreme Court against the Badgley
Company, the AVCO Corporation (which maintained the plane),
and the Bendix Corporation (which made the allegedly faulty
component). Later in the same month, Mrs. Badgley, the wife of
the deceased pilot, and the Badgley Company filed suit against
AVCO, Bendix, and Mooney Aircraft, Inc. (the maker of the
plane), as did the estates of the other deceased passengers.
The Badgley Company then moved to have all the actions tried
jointly in the Onondaga County Supreme Court. Fearful of pre-
judice from a state court, the Barch attorneys decided to remove
the case to a federal court. The Surrogate Court of Onondaga
County allowed Mrs. Barch to resign as administratrix and ap-
pointed O'Brien, a New Jersey resident, as administrator c.t.a.
so that federal diversity jurisdiction could be obtained. O'Brien
thus subsequently brought suit in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York on the grounds of diver-
sity of citizenship. Before the case was heard on the merits, an
interlocutory appeal was granted by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit; the court held that the appoint-
ment of an administrator c.t.a. of an estate for the purpose of ob-
taining federal diversity jurisdiction is "improper" or "collusive"
-within the meaning of section 1359 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. O'Brien v. A CO Corp., 425 F.2d 1030 (2d Cir.
1969).
In its opinion the Second Circuit court stated that:
[T]he sole question for determination on appeal is
whether appointment of an administrator c.t.a. of an
estate for the purpose of invoking federal diversity
171
1
et al.: Recent Decisions
Published by Scholar Commons, 1971
SouTH. CAitoinA LAw REv[V
jurisdiction is "improper" or "collusive" within the
meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1964).1
The defendant's basic contention was that the appointment of
O'Brien as administrator c.t.a. for the sole purpose of invoking
federal diversity jurisdiction violated section 1359 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure which was designed to prevent "man-
ufactured diversity."2 O'Brien contended, however, that his ap-
pointment was not a violation of section 1359 and based his argu-
ment on Lang v. Elm City Construction Co." In this case the
court permitted manufactured diversity where the appointee was
a fiduciary, such as an administrator. The value of the Lang case
as precedent was however, doubtful because Lang was a per
curiam opinion with the only reasoning being a citation to Corabl
'v. Auto Racing, Inc.,4 a Third Circuit case. Thus, the Corabi de-
cision was of crucial importance to the O'Brien court.
The Corabi decision was based on Black & White Taxi-Cab
& Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co.5
where the court held that, if there was an actual transfer, an as-
signment would not be collusive regardless of motive. This case
received universal condemnation as a flagrant abuse of diversity
jurisdiction, and its continuing validity is doubtful.0 Of greater
importance to the O'Brien court was the fact that Corabi, on
1. O'Brien v. AVCO Corp., 425 F.2d 1030, 1031 (2d Cir. 1969). 28 U.S.C.
§ 1359 refers to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1964) states that "[a] district court shall not have
jurisdiction of a civil action in which any party, by assignment or otherwise, has
been improperly or collusively made or joined to invoke the jurisdiction of such
court."
3. 324 F2d 235 (2d Cir. 1963).
4. 264 F.2d 784 (3d Cir. 1959). In this case a Pennsylvania minor was killed
at a car race. The deceased's mother was administratrix but was allowed to
resign expressly for the purpose of enabling the court to appoint a non-resident
as administrator to create federal diversity jurisdiction. The Third Circuit held
that the appointment of a non-resident administrator for the sole purpose of
creating federal jurisdiction was not "collusive" or "improper" within the
meaning of section 1359. Id. at 788.
5. 276 U.S. 518 (1928). In this case, a Kentucky corporation transferred its
corporate interest to a Tennessee corporation so that a federal action could be
brought to enjoin two Kentucky corporations from interference with contract
rights.
6. C. WRIGH, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COUNTS § 31, at 86 n.17
(1963). Not only was Black & White Taxicab a weakpoint of Corabi, but
Corabi also suggested that the dictionary interpretation of "collusive" illustrated
that section 1359 prohibited only secret agreements. The O'Brien court stated
that the purpose of § 1359 "[w]as to prevent arguments whose primary aim was
to vest the court with a jurisdiction it had not formerly enjoyed." 425 F.d
1030, 1034 (2d Cir. 1969).
[Vol. 23
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which Lang rested, had been expressly overruled by the Third
Circuit in McSparran v. Weist.7
In McSparran the court held that a third party appointed as
administrator solely for the purpose of creating diversity juris-
diction is improperly or collusively named if he has no real or
substantial interest in the dispute. The MoSparra court limited
its decision to disallowance of diversity jurisdiction where the
appointed fiduciary was a straw party based on a naked arrange-
ment aimed solely at creating diversity jurisdiction.8 The court
felt that the desire to achieve diversity was not in itself improper
and that usually the motives behind appointment of a fiduciary
should not be considered. However, where diversity jurisdiction
depends on the citizenship of a fiduciary whose citizenship is dif-
ferent from that of his beneficiary, motive should be examined in
order to determine if the fiduciary is a straw party. The burden
of proof is on the party asserting diversity jurisdiction to prove
that the fiduciary is not a mere straw party. If the burden is not
carried, the representative is not treated as a true fiduciary, and
the citizenship of the beneficiary is determinative.
The most recent Supreme Court pronouncement on section 1359
was in Kramer v. Carribean Mills, Inc.9 The Court held that an
assignment for the purpose of creating federal jurisdiction vio-
lative section 1359 if the assignor retained a substantial interest
in the outcome of the case.10 In discussing Kramer, the court was
unable to find any significant reason for distinguishing the ap-
pointment of the administrator in the instant case and the assign-
ment involved in that case. The court, therefore, regarded the
opinion in Kramer as impliedly overruling the grounds on which
their Lang decision was based.1 The Second Circuit also felt that
the Third Circuit's explicit overruling of Corabi, on which Lang
rested, further invalidated their Lang decision. Thus, the court
7. 402 F.2d 867 (3d Cir. 1968). The pertinent facts of this case are identical
in nature to the facts of Corabi. A straw party was chosen as guardian of an
injured minor solely for the purpose of creating diversity jurisdiction.
8. The McSparran court distinguished Black & White Taxicab on its facts.
In Black & White Taxicab the new corporation, which was created to establish
diversity jurisdiction, was not a mere "strawv"-the transaction was real and
had importance beyond creating federal diversity jurisdiction.
9. 394 U.S. 823 (1969). A Panamanian corporation assigned its entire in-
terest in a contract with a Haitian corporation to a Texas attorney so that an
action could be brought in a United States federal court on grounds of diversity
of citizenship jurisdiction. The Texas attorney promised to pay the Panamanian
Corporation 951 of any net recovery on the assigned cause of action.
10. The Supreme Court expressly reserved its opinion on the question of
fiduciaries appointed to confer diversity jurisdiction.
11. 425 F2d at 1036.
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no longer considered Lang as binding and held that the appoint-
ment of an administrator c.t.a. for the purpose of obtaining fed-
eral diversity jurisdiction violated section 1359. In dismissing the
action from federal court, Judge Kaufman stated that:
Plaintiffs have a viable action pending in the state
courts, and will suffer no hardship other than loss of the
federal forum they did not deserve. 12
The present trend in federal diversity actions is toward abolish-
ing manufactured diversity as a vehicle to achieve federal juris-
diction, but the issue has not been firmly decided in some cir-
cuits.1 3 In the Fourth Circuit, the issue appears to be settled that
the appointment of a non-resident fiduciary for the sole purpose
of creating federal diversity jurisdiction is violative of section
1359.14 However, since the issue of manufactured diversity is still
unsettled in some circuits, a United States Supreme Court deci-
sion would be helpful in clarifying the law in this area of federal
jurisdiction. When, and if, the Supreme Court hears such a case,
the affirmation of cases such as O'Bien and McSparra will be
welcomed by an overburdened federal system.
WALLA CE G. HOLLAND
12. Id. at 1036.
13. See McSparran v. Weist, 402 F2d 867 (3d Cir. 1968); Lester v. Mc-
Fadden, 415 F.2d 1101 (4th Cir. 1969).
14. Lester v. McFadden, 415 F,2d 1101 (4th Cir. 1969). See also Arant v.
Stover, 307 F. Supp. 144 (S.C. 1969) in which Judge Hemphill stated that "[t]
he Fourth Circuit now frowns on the forum shopping practiced by invoking
federal jurisdiction through artificial or collusive means." Id. at 151.
[Vol. 23
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C IL RIGHTS-Private College Discipline and Due Process
Afforded to Students-Jurisdiction of federal district court over
class action brought by students alleging violation of first, fifth,
and fourteenth amendment rights by a private college disciplin-
ary board is dependent on there being state action. Counts V.
Voorhees College (D.S.C. 1970).
The plaintiffs sought to invoke federal jurisdiction upon fed-
eral constitutional grounds in order to obtain a reversal of dis-
ciplinary expulsions and suspensions of several students. The
disciplinary actions followed a student boycott of classes pro-
testing the failure of the college to rehire four faculty members.
College administrators had reacted to the boycott by closing the
college and obtaining a state court restraining order prohibiting
students and faculty from remaining on the campus. The de-
fendants subsequently charged one hundred sixty-three students
with violations of specific college regulations during the boycott.
These students were notified of the charges against them, of the
time and place of disciplinary hearings, and that they would have
an opportunity to be heard. Students who appeared at the hear-
ings were advised of their rights to representation, to present
their own witnesses, to question witnesses presented against them
by the college at the hearing, and that continuances would be
granted if desired. After the hearings each student was notified
of the disciplinary action taken against him and of his right to
appeal. Appeals to Voorhees College appellate committees by
some of the twenty students dismissed or suspended were still
pending when the plaintiffs filed suit in the federal district court.
The court, after a full hearing, held that injunctive relief
could not be granted because the plaintiffs had failed to estab-
lish federal jurisdiction to enjoin the college disciplinary pro-
ceedings, and that, even if jurisdiction had existed, there was no
basis on the merits of the case to grant such relief. Pursuant to
these findings the court dismissed the complaint. Counts v. Voor-
hees College, 312 F. Supp. 598 (D.S.C. 1970).
Courts traditionally have been reluctant to interfere with col-
lege and university disciplinary procedures.' One reason has
been that section one prohibitions of the fourteenth amendment
are directed primarily at state action2 ; therefore, acts of private
1. See, e.g., John B. Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, 88 Fla. 510, 102 So. 637 (1924) ;
Gott v. Berea College, 156 Ky. 376, 161 S.W. 204 (Ky. App. 1913) ; Anthony v.
Syracuse Univ., 224 App. Div. 487, 231 N.Y.S. 435 (4th Dep't 1928).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 provides: "[N]or shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law...."
5
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individuals and institutions have generally fallen outside the pro-
scriptive sphere of the amendment.3 In the past decade, however,
many courts have relied on the state action doctrinO and recog-
nized tax supported public universities as instrumentalities of the
state, thereby extending fourteenth amendment due process pro-
tections to dismissed or suspended students.5 But p'ivate univer-
sity disciplinary procedures are still largely immune from judi-
cial review; the constitutionally required rights to due process,
defined by the court in Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Educa-
tion," have not yet been extended to private university students.
7
The court in Counts dealt with two principle issues: that of
jurisdiction and that of whether the affected students had been
afforded constitutionally required rights to due process through-
out the disciplinary proceedings. Although the question of juris-
diction controlled whether the relief sought could be granted, the
court determined that it was necessary to dispose of the matter
on the merits.8 Otherwise, any relief that the court could have
granted to reinstate the expelled and suspended students would
have been of little practical value if such relief were appreciably
delayed.9 The court therefore heard the case on the merits and
reserved its ruling on the question of the court's jurisdiction until
all the evidence was fully developed by the parties.
3. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 10-11 (1883), where the Court said:
"It is state action of a particular character that is prohibited. Individual inva-
sion of individual rights is not the subject-matter of the [fourteenth] amend-
ment." See also 16 Am. Jum. 2d Constitutional Law § 475 (1964).
4. The state action doctrine invokes fourteenth amendment proscriptions es-
sentially by equating formally private conduct with state conduct by finding in
the private conduct some state control, the performance of a state or public
function, or the existence of several state contacts. See, e.g., Amalgamated Food
Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (;1968) ; Evans
v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth. 365
U.S. 715 (1961) ; Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of City Trusts, 353 U.S.
230 (1957); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Marsh v. Alabama, 326
U.S. 501 (1946).
5. See Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961),
-cert. denied, 368 U. S. 930 (1961) (holding that in a disciplinary action a stu-
dent at a tax supported institution is entitled to notice that he is charged with
misconduct, a statement of and justification of the charges, a list of names of
witnesses against him and their proposed testimony, an opportunity to present
his defense, and an opportunity to inspect the report of the findings of the dis-
.ciplinary body); Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 290 F. Supp. 622 (W.D.
Mo. 1968); Hammond v. South Carolina State College, 272 F. Supp. 947
(D.S.C. 1967). See also Barker v. Hardway, 283 F. Supp. 228 (S.D.W. Va.
1968), aff'd 399 F.2d 638 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 905 (1969).
6. 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961).
7. See, e.g., Browns v. Mitchell, 409 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1969); Powe v.
Miles, 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968); Grossner v. Trustees of Columbia Univ.,
287 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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In its evaluation of the evidence, the court proceeded on the
premise that, if Voorhees were a state supported college, the dis-
ciplined students would thereby be entitled to protection of their
first, fifth, and fourteenth amendment rights. The plaintiffs'
contentions that the closing of the college and the disciplinary
actions were designed to put a chilling effect on the plaintiffs'
first amendment rights to free speech and assembly were refuted
by the court on evidence that "the decision to close the college was
prompted and motivated by a proper desire to protect its stu-
dents, faculty ... and . . . property from riot and destruction
.... 110 The court found, moreover, that the notices funished to
the students contained as much information as is generally con-
tained in a criminal indictment and therefore met the require-
ments of federal due process." No federal question is involved
when a college fails to advise a student, in a notice of charges,
of student "rights" granted by the college and prescribed in a
student handbook or other college publication. 12 Thus, although
the notices of the charges and hearings given by Voorhees to the
students did not specifically advise them of their right to counsel
and to have witnesses available (this was done orally at the hear-
ings) as required by the student handbook, no federal due pro-
cess right was denied and no jurisdiction was bestowed upon the
court under such circumstances.13 Finally, the Voorhees dis-
ciplinary procedures were fully sufficient to meet the require-
ments of due process defined in Diaon'4 for imposition on state
supported institutions.'5 On these findings the court concluded
that the constitutional rights of the complainants had been fully
10. Id. at 605.
11. Id. One reason given for the disciplinary process of a college not being
equivalent to state or federal criminal law process is that, while an expelled stu-
dent may suffer damaging effects to his educational, social, or economic future,
he may not be imprisoned, fined, disenfranchised, or subject to probationary
supervision. Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 290 F. Supp. 622, 628 (W.D.
Mo. 1968).
12. Stricklin v. Regents of Univ. of Wis., 297 F. Supp. 416, 421 (W.D. Wis.
1969) (where the court, regarding the situation of the university regents' with-
holding from the plaintiffs a "right" conferred by the regents in their own by-
laws, said: "Whether the Regents have honored their own By-Laws is not a
federal question. Nor is it a question with constitutional overtones, except to
the extent that a procedure required by a by-law coincides with a procedure re-
quired by the Constitution of the United States.")
13. 312 F. Supp. at 606. It should be noted that, even if a federal question
had been involved, jurisdiction would have vested in the federal district court
only if Voorhees were a public college or the court found state action.
14. The requirements are listed in note 5 supra.
15. 312 F. Supp. at 605.
7
et al.: Recent Decisions
Published by Scholar Commons, 1971
Souza CAnor.iNA LAW REvW L 2
protected by the procedures and actions taken by the defendant
private college.16
From the wording of the complaint the court assumed that the
plaintiffs sought to invoke federal jurisdiction pursuant to Title
42, Section 1983 and Title 28, Section 1343(3) of the United
States Code.17 Section 19831s creates a substantive right against
any person who acts, inter aZia, under color of state law to violate
college students' constitutional rights through disciplinary ac-
tion.19 Section 1343(3)20 creates a procedural right by granting
original jurisdiction to federal district courts for enforcement of
section 1983. These substantive and procedural rights are limited
in application to complaints which allege deprivation of consti-
tutional rights under color of state law.2' Therefore, since state
action, not federal action, is the concern of section 1983, jurisdic-
tion of the federal district court could not be invoked merely
upon the plaintiffs' proof that the college received federal finan-
cial assistance for construction, scholarships, and student aid.22
The court in Counts was faced with the question of what con-
stitutes "state action" as contemplated by sections 198323 and
1343(3) .24 In their complaint the plaintiffs did not allege any
obvious financial or regulatory state involvement in the Voorhees
disciplinary procedures. The evidence revealed that Voorhees
College was a private, sectarian, liberal arts college supported by
the Episcopal Church, tuitions, and student fees. It received no
state financial assistance.25 In their complaint the plaintiffs as-
16. Id.
17. Id. at 606.
18. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1871) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regula-
tion, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
19. 312 F. Supp. at 606.
20. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1964) provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action authorized by law to be commenced by any person:
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law,
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, priv-
ilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States
or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens
or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States.
21. 312 F. Supp. at 607.
22. Id. at 606.
23. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1871).
24. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1964).
25. 312 F. Supp. at 601.
[Vol. 
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serted that the alleged abridgements of their first, fifth, and
fourteenth amendment rights were effected by two individual de-
fendants, the Chairman of the Board of Trustees and the Acting
President of Voorhees College, and the defendant college.26
These facts failed to disclose any obvious state involvement with
the defendants' actions upon which the court could support a
finding of state action and establish jurisdiction. However, the
plaintiffs did allege that Voorhees College served a "public func-
tion" in the field of education and that operation of the college
involved non-obvious state participation and was, in effect, state
action.27 The court, therefore, sought to determine from the evi-
dence if there -was a sufficient accumulation of various indicia of
state involvement to support a finding of state action.
28
The "public function" doctrine was also asserted in Powe V.
Miles,2 9 but the court pointed out that a college campus is not
public property"0 and that education is not an exclusively govern-
mental function.31 Even where, as in Powe, there were numerous
administrative, financial, and regulatory contacts between the
university and the state, there must be the additional element of
direct state participation in the activity that caused the com-
plaint to reach a finding of state action.32 That is, the state ac-
tion, not the private action, must be the subject of the complaint.33
26. Id. at 606.
27. Id. at 600. The plaintiffs' contention was that the defendants' operation
as a private institution so effected a public interest or its intricate involvement
with governmental functions were such that it could not escape the prohibitions
of the first, fifth, and fourteenth amendments to the federal constitution, and that
operation of the college was, in effect, state action.
28. This is, in essence, the test for non-obvious state involvement stated in
Burton, v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961). For a discus-
sion of types of conduct that might constitute non-obvious involvement of the
state, ree Developments it the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1045,
1056-64 (1968).
29. 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968). In this case Alfred University, a private
university, operated on its campus the New York State College of Ceramics
under contract with the State of New York. Administration of the ceramics
college involved numerous administrative, financial, and regulatory contacts
between Alfred and the state. Four liberal arts students from Alfred and three
ceramic college students were suspended following student demonstrations. The
court held that regulation of demonstrations and the discipline of students at the
ceramics college by the president and dean of students at Alfred constituted
state action and the three students affected thereby should have been afforded
federal constitutional rights. The other four students, by virtue of their atten-
dance at the "private" portion of Alfred, were not accorded the same rights. Id.
30. Id. at 80.
31. Id.
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In Browns v. Hitc7teZl 34 the court held that a private univer-
sity which received no state funds but enjoyed a tax exemption of
approximately $210,000 not enjoyed by other like corporations
did not constitute state action within the meaning of section
1983.35 The court stated: "[T]he due process provisions of the
fourteenth amendment proscribe state action only and do not
reach acts of private persons unless they are acting 'under color
of state law.' ,,
36
In Grossner v. Trustees of Columbia University37 the court
denied the students' motion for injunctive relief asserted under
section 1983,38 on the grounds that, while education is considered
in the public interest, education as such did not constitute "state
action" subject to federal constitutional requirements.8 9
Powe, Browns, and Grossner are all readily distinguishable
from Counts in that the evidence in each case (except Counts)
disclosed indicia of state involvement, although the indicia were
insufficient for the respective courts to support a finding of state
action. The court in Counts concluded:
[T]here is no showing that the state created or regu-
lates Voorhees College in any manner .... It contributes
nothing to its support, and it is not... involved in the
disciplinary action complained of. Its campus is not
public property nor is its function that of government.
There being no state action, it follows that there is no
federal jurisdiction of the matters here complained of.'
10
The denial of federal court jurisdiction in Counts was pre-
dictable and consistent with other recent federal court decisions.
Although a full evidentiary hearing was required to develop fully
the existence or nonexistence of state action, the case could have
been disposed of solely on the question of jurisdiction. Instead,
the court took the opportunity to examine the rights afforded the
students during the disciplinary proceedings closely. Analysis of
34. 409 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1969). In this case, action was brought for in-
junctive relief in the nature of reinstatement by students who had been suspended
for sit-ins in a non-public area of a building at the private University of
Colorado.
35. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1871).
36. Browns v. Mitchell, 409 F2d 593, 594 (10th Cir. 1969).
37. 287 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). The action in this case sought in-
junctive relief against pending disciplinary proceedings resulting from student
participation, inter alia, in seizing campus buildings.
38. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1871).
39. Grossner v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 287 F. Supp. 535, 549 (S.D.N.Y.
1968).
40. 312 F. Supp. at 607.
[Vol. 23
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several of the authorities cited by the court in Counts reveals
anomalous situations in which students are afforded substantially
different rights for substantially similar conduct merely by rea-
son of their attendance at a "private" as opposed to a "public"
college or university. The same indicia of state involvement that,
until now, have been held insufficient to support a finding of
state action at a private college may, in the future, be construed
to support such a finding. The court in Counts followed the tra-
ditional guidelines used by most courts in determining the exis-
tence of jurisdiction to review college disciplinary proceedings.
However, it may well have ruled differently on the question of
jurisdiction had the merits revealed, contrary to the facts here,
that the affected students had been denied their constitutionally
required rights to due process.
WnzAm J. DEAN
11
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INTERSTATE COMMERCE-"Primary Business Test"--A pri-
vate warehouse company, which did not do business with the gen-
eral public, and which transported about five percent of the sup-
plies stored by it outside the state without a certificate of neces-
sity and convenience was a "contract carrier" and violated the In-
terstate Commerce Act. I.C.O. v. V. S. C. Wholesale-Warehouse
Co. (D. Idaho 1969).
The defendant, V.S.C. Wholesale-Warehouse Co.,1 is an Idaho
corporation engaged in the business of warehousing and distri-
buting mobile home and travel trailer materials and furnishings
for approximately forty producers located throughout the United
States. Ninety-five percent of the merchandise warehoused was
moved from the various producers to the warehouse facilities by
common carrier, with the balance being transported for compen-
sation from California producers to Idaho by trucks leased and
controlled by V.S.O. It is this latter five percent that is at issue
in this case.
Title to all the merchandise handled by V.S.C. remains in the
producer at all times, regardless of the means by which it is
transported, with V.S.C. acting only as an agent for the produc-
ers. V.S.C. charges the producers from two to three percent of
the dollar volume for the transportation, and the revenue re-
ceived therefrom is accounted for separately from its warehouse
revenues. V.S.C. contended that it must perform this transporta-
tion in order to maintain a sufficient inventory of short supply
items and to meet emergency demands. The facts further dem-
onstrated that agricultural commodities, which are exempt from
the Interstate Commerce Act, were solicited for and transported
from Idaho to California and such revenue was commingled with
the other transportation revenue. The district court concluded
that V.S.C.'s transportation services were outside the scope of its
warehousing business. Therefore, the court held that V.S.C. was
in violation of the Interstate Commerce Act and should be en-
joined from continuing such interstate transportation without
proper authority from the Interstate Commerce Commission.
I.C.C. v. V.S.C. Wholesale-Warehouse Co., 312 F. Supp. 542 (D.
Idaho 1969).
The United States Constitution gives Congress the power to
regulate commerce among the states.2 Pursuant to this power
1. Hereinafter referred to as V.S.C.
Z U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8.
[Vol. 9.3
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Congress enacted the Interstate Commerce Act, certain provi-
sions of which V.S.C. was charged with violating.3 It has been
held that definitions set forth in this Act should be read together
and construed liberally in order to fulfill the purpose of the Act,
which is to end for-hire transportation under the guise of private
carriage.
4
As an aid to interpreting the definition of a private carrier5
and to differentiate between pseudo-private carriage and trans-
portation that is actually in furtherance of a non-carrier business,
the Interstate Commerce Commission developed the "primary
business test." This test was first enunciated by the Commission
in Lenoir Ohair Co., Contract Carrier Application:
If the facts establish that the primary business of an op-
erator is the supplying of transportation for compensa-
tion then the carrier's status is established though the
operator may be the owner, at the time, of the goods
transported and may be transporting them for the pur-
pose of sale....
If, on the other hand, the primary business of the oper-
ator is found to be manufacturing or some other non-
carrier commercial enterprise, then it must be deter-
mined whether the motor operations are in bona fide
furtherance of the primary business or whether they are
conducted as a related or secondary enterprise with the
3. I mnSTATs Commnca AcT § 203(C), 49 U.S.C. § 303(C) (1964). The
provision that V.S.C. allegedly violated states:
[N]o person shall engage in any for-hire transportation business
by motor vehicle, in interstate or foreign commerce, on any public
highway or within any reservation under the exclusive jurisdiction
of the United States, unless there is in force with respect to such
person a certificate or a permit issued by the Commission authoriz-
ing such transportation, nor shall any person engaged in any other
business enterprise transport property by motor vehicle in interstate
or foreign commerce for business purposes unles.s such transporta-
tion is within the scope, and in the furtherance of a primary busi-
ness enterprise (other than transportation) of such person.
(Emphasis added) ; see also § 206(a), 49 U.S.C. § 306 (a) (requiring a cer-
tificate of public convenience and necessity for operation as a common carrier) ;
§ 209(a), 49 U.S.C. § 309(a) (requiring a permit for operation as a contract
carrier).
4. A. W. Stickle & Co. v. I.C.C., 128 F.2d 155 (10th Cir. 1942), cert. denied,
317 U.S. 650 (1942).
5. INTERSTATE CommancE AcT § 203(a) (17), 49 U.S.C. § 303(a) (17)
(1964) defines a private carrier as:
[A]ny person not included in the terms "common carrier by motor
vehicle" or "contract carrier by motor vehicle," who or which
transports in interstate or foreign commerce by motor vehicle prop-
erty of which such person is the owner, lessee, or bailee, when
such transportation is for the purpose of sale, lease, rent, or bail-
ment, or in furtherance of any commercial enterprise.
13
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purpose of profiting from the transportation performed.
In our opinion, they cannot be both. 6
The Commission's test was upheld by the courts in Brooks Trans-
portation Co. v. United Btates7 and Red BaN Motor Freight, Ino.
v. Shannon? as well as being subsequently codified in 1958 by
amendment to section 203(C) of the Interstate Commerce Act.
This amendment specifically provided that the transportation
must, first, be within the scope and, second, in furtherance of a
primary business enterprise other than transportation. Both as-
pects of this test must be satisfied if the transportation is to be
private carriage.9
Using this test, the V.S.C. court concluded that the transporta-
tion furnished by V.S.C. was clearly in furtherance of its non-
transportation business of warehousing. However, the court
would not accept transportation of this magnitude0 as being
within the scope of V.S.C.'s warehousing business: "The trans-
portation activities now before the court go beyond that degree
of carriage which might reasonably be deemed to be within the
scope of a usual warehousing establishment."" The main point
that brought the court to this conclusion was the fact that V.S.C.
served only California producers with transportation. This
tended to point out that V.S.C.'s transportation service was not
actually in bona fide furtherance of warehousing, but was sup-
plementary to hauling the exempt agricultural products to
California, thereby creating a separate enterprise. In addition,
V.S.C. did not show why the five percent transported by it could
not be delivered by common carrier as efficiently as the other
ninety-five percent. Of paramount importance was the court's
reasoning that, if they held this transportation to be private car-
riage, nothing would preclude V.S.C. from expanding this opera-
tion into even greater magnitude.' 2 For these reasons the court
found that V.S.C. failed to qualify as a private carrier under
section 203 (a) (17) of the Interstate Commerce Act.
6. Red Ball Motor Freight, Inc. v. Shannon, 377 U.S. 315 (1964), quoitnu
from 51 M.C.C. 75 (1949).
7. 93 F. Supp. 517 (E.D. Va. 1950), affd per curiam, 340 U.S. 925 (1950).
8. 377 U.S. 311 (1964).
9. Church Point Wholesale Beverage Co. v. United States, 200 F. Supp. 508
(W.D. La. 1961).
10. V.S.C.'s books showed receipts of $22,394.
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Since V.S.C. did not hold its services out to the general public,
it clearly was not a "common carrier."13 However, V.S.C. did
fulfill the requirements for a "contract carrier, '14 in that it pro-
vided transportation designed to meet the distinct need of each
individual customer under contract. The assessment of charges
-by the carrier and payment thereof by the producers were suf-
ficient evidence to support the court's finding of the existence of
a contract.'5
V.S.C. contended, however, that it could not be a contract car-
rier under the Act, because it performed the transportation ser-
vices without profit. This claim has been refuted in previous
cases which hold that reimbursement for expenses of operation
meets the requirement that there be compensation.: 6 In any event,
in Studna v. United States 17 the court stated that the history of
the Act shows that the proper criterion is the "primary business
test" and not the compensation factor cited by V.S.C. Therefore,
the court concluded:
The provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act relating
to motor vehicles are sufficiently broad and comprehen-
sive to include within its scope all those who, regardless
of the procedure or manner of operation involved, are in
substance engaged in transporting property in interstate
commerce for hire.'8
Thus, the court held that V.S.C. was in violation of the Inter-
13. INTERSTATE COMMERcE AcT § 203(a) (14), 49 U.S.C. § 303(a) (14)
(1964) provides:
[A]ny person which holds itself out to the general public to engage
in the transportation by motor vehicle in interstate or foreign com-
merce of passengers or property or any class or classes thereof
for compensation, whether over regular or irregular routes ....
14. Id. at § 203(a) (15), 49 U.S.C. at § 303(a) (15) provides:
[A]ny person which engages in transportation by motor vehicle of
passengers or property in interstate or foreign commerce, for com-
pensation (other than transportation referred to in paragraph (14)
of this subsection and the exception therein) under continuing con-
tracts with one person or a limited number of persons either (a)
for the furnishing of transportation services through the assign-
ment of motor vehicles for a continuing period of time to the ex-
clusive use of each person served, or (b) for the furnishing of
transportation services designed to meet the distinct need of each
individual customer.
15. 312 F. Supp. at 548.
16. Shippers Cooperative, Inc. v. I.C.C., 308 F.2d 888 (9th Cir. 1962) ; Schen-
Iey Distillers Corp. v. United States, 61 F. Supp. 981 (D. Del. 1945), aff'd, 326
U.S. 432 (1946).
17. 225 F. Supp. 973 (W.D. Mo. 1964).
18. 312 F. Supp. at 548; I.C.C. v. Teeter, 228 F. Supp. 479 (N.D. Ga. 1964);
B & C Truck Leasing, Inc. v. I.C.C., 283 F.2d 163 (10th Cir. 1960).
15
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state Commerce Act and should be enjoined from continuing
such interstate transportation without proper authority.19
This case exemplifies the trend of the courts in recent years to
support the Commission in its attempts to protect its authorized
interstate transporters by restricting the scope of private car-
riage, as authorized by the 1958 amendment.20 The courts will,
undoubtedly, continue this trend in the future by interpreting the
Interstate Commerce Act liberally in order to hault for-hire in-
terstate transportation under the guise of private carriage.
SAMEL R. KILGoRE, JR.
19. 312 F. Supp. at 548-49.
20. Church Point Wholesale Beverage Co. v. United States, 200 F. Supp. 508
(W.D. La. 1961). See also note 16, ip ra.
[Vol. 23
16
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [1971], Art. 16
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol23/iss1/16
RECnWT DEcisioNs
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODF-ARTICLE NINE-lHIybine
being used by non-farmer is "farm equipment" for which a
financing statement need not be filed in order to perfect a pur-
chase money security interest under Section 9-302(1) (c) of the
U:niform Commercial Code. Citizens Nat'Z Bank v. Sperry-Rand
Corp. (Tex. Civ. App. 1970).
Reynolds, the owner and operator of a retail feed and grain
store, purchased a haybine1 for use in a commercial hay cutting
and baling business which he operated in connection with his
store. The purchase price of the machine was $2,280, of which
$780 was paid in cash. To cover the balance, the seller reserved
a purchase money security interest in the haybine. He later
assigned this interest to the appellee, Sperry-Rand Corporation.
No financing statement was filed either by the seller or by the
appellee. Seven months later, while still indebted to appellee,
Reynolds, having obtained a loan, executed a security agreement
in favor of the appellant bank in which the same haybine was
designated as collateral. The bank promptly filed a financing
statement with the Secretary of State.2 Subsequently, Reynolds
defaulted on the loan, and the bank foreclosed and sold the
haybine.
Sperry-Rand, assignee of the first security interest, instituted
an action for conversion, and the lower court rendered summary
judgment against the defendant bank. On appeal the court
affirmed and hed, that the haybine was "farm equipment"
under Section 9.302(a) (3) of the Texas Business and Commerce
Code and the security interest in it was thus perfected without
being filed. The result being that Sperry-Rand's perfected but
unfiled security interest had priority over the filed security in-
terest of appellant bank under Section 9.312 of the Texas Busi-
ness and Commerce Code. Citizens Natl Bank v. Sperry-Rand
Corp. (Tex. Civ. App. 1970).
1. "Haybine" was defined by the court in this case as a machine designed,
marketed, and used to mow, condition and windrow hay in a single step.
2. V.T.C.A., Bus. & C. § 9.401(a) (3) (1968) requires a security interest
in goods of the type claimed by the appellant, "equipment used in a retail store
operation," to be filed with the Secretary of State in order to be perfected.
Since the court held that the haybine was equipment used in farming opera-
tions, the proper place to file would be the office of the register of mesne
conveyances or the clerk of court in the county of the debtor's residence, under
V.T.C.A., Bus. & C. § 9.401(a) (1). The filing requirements of the South
Carolina Code are identical to those of the Texas Code; thus the result as to
the place of filing would be the same in South Carolina as in Texas. See S.C.
CODE AN. § 10.9-401(1) (a) (c).
17
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The central issue before the court was whether a haybine used
by a non-farmer in a commercial hay cutting business was "farm
equipment" within the exemption from filing provision of the
Code, 3 or merely "equipment" and, therefore, subject to the
filing requirements.4 In deciding the question, the court failed
to adopt an exact standard to be applied in determining the
appropriate classification of different types of "goods". Such a
standard is, however, made necessary by Section 9-109 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, which lists four categories of
"goods'.
The traditional standard determinative as to classification is
the "use" or "primary use" test., The basis for this test is simply
the primary use made of the goods during any particular period
of time. An early case in which the "use" test was applied was
I"'re Leiby7 This case involved a determination of whether an
excavating machine was "farm equipment" or merely "equip-
ment" within the meaning of the Uniform Commercial Code.
The court relied on the words, "used or bought for use", in the
Code definition of "equipment" to ascertain the proper category
for the machine in question." Elucidating this test further, the
court stated that the:
use for which the equipment is actually purchased or
the use actually made of the equipment is the criterion
to be employed when determining what steps are neces-
3. V.T.C.A., Bus. & C. § 9.302(a) (3) (1968) provides:
(a) A financing statement must be filed to perfect all security
interests except the following:
(3) a purchase money security interest in farm equipment having
a purchase price not in excess of $2,500.
4. Id.
5. UNIFORM COMIMERCLA CODE § 9-109 defines "Goods" as "Consumer
Goods," "Equipment," "Inventory," or "Farm Products." However, since a
purchase money security interest in farm equipment having a purchase price
less than $2,500 is perfected without filing, it is necessary to separate "equip-
ment' into two categories: "mere equipment" which is used in the trade or
business, and "farm equipment."
6. See, e.g., It re Leiby, 1 UCC REP. Sr. 428 (E.D. Pa. 1962); In re
Anderson, 6 UCC REP. SER. 1284 (S.D. Ohio 1969); In re La Rose, 7 UCC
REP. SER. 964 (D. Conn. 1970); Funk, Problems of Classification Undcr
Article Nine of the Uniform Commercial Code, 102 PA. L. REv. 703 (1954).
7. 1 UCC REP. San. 428 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
8. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-109(2) defines "goods" as "equipment
if they are used or bought for use primarily in business (including farming or
a profession) . . . or if the goods are not included in the definitions of inven-
tory, farm products, or consumer goods." This provision is identical to § 9-
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sary by the secured party in order to perfect a security
interest.9
In a recent Connecticut case, In re La Rose,'0 the court also
applied a "primary use" test in differentiating between "equip-
ment" and "farm equipment". The use of this test is apparently
in accord with the intent of the drafters of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code."
The criterion of classification urged by the appellant in
Sperry-Rand was a "primary capacity and use" test.12 This
standard is similar to the "primary use" method of classification
but allows the court to consider the occupational status or
"capacity" of the user-debtor as well as the use to which the
goods are actually put. The appellant argued that the applica-
tion of such a test would determine that a refrigerator is "inven-
tory" in the hands of a dealer, "equipment" in the hands of a
doctor, and "consumer goods" in the hands of a house-holder.
Similarly, a tractor could be "inventory" in the hands of a
dealer, "consumer goods" in the hands of a householder who uses
it to keep his yard, "construction equipment" in the hands of a
contractor, and "farm equipment" in the hands of a farmer.'3
The point being made by the appellant is that the "capacity" of
the user at the time the "goods" are utilized is actually deter-
minative of the category into which those "goods" should be
placed. Although the court did not accept the bank's argument,
it was found to be persuasive, and the court stated that it "might
find its [the bank's] suggested method of classification to be
valid under other circumstances."'14 However, no hint of those
other circumstances can be found in the opinion.
The language used by the Sperry-Rand court in the conclud-
ing paragraph of its opinion is the familiar terminology most
commonly associated with the "use" test.15 In restating this test,
9. 1 UCC REP. SEm. at 429.
10. 7 UCC REP. SER. 964 (D. Conn. 1970).
11. UNIFOR-M COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-109, Comment 2 states that "In bor-
derline cases ... the principal use to which the property is put should be
considered as determinative."
12. 456 S.W.2d 273 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970). See also Sequoia Machinery,
Inc. v. Jarrett, 410 F.2d 1116 (9th Cir. 1969), which involved the sale of a
combine to a non-farmer who used the machine to harvest the crops of others.
The court, refusing to consider the occupational status of the user, in effect
renounced a "primary use and capacity" test. In re Anderson, 6 UCC REP.
SEr. 1284 (S.D. Ohio 1969) reached the same result on different facts.
13. 456 S.W.2d at 275.
14. Id.
15. See note 6 supra.
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the court said that the haybine was "farm equipment," since
Reynolds "bought it for and used it only for [the] purpose for
-which it was designed and marketed.""' This assertion is, how-
ever, not convincing as a determinative standard when one con-
siders that a haybine, or indeed any other type of highly spe-
cialized "goods", is susceptible of only one "use"--that for which
it was designed and marketed.
The best explanation of the court's decision in the Speiry-
Band case is probably the policy consideration underlying the
provision of Section 9-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code
which exempts "farm equipment" from the filing requirement.
The policy reasons for granting this exemption rest on the
assumption that
the practice of farmers and other consumers to buy
items of equipment on conditional sales contracts is so
common that the chances of misleading other creditors
does not seem serious enough to impose the added cost
of filing upon all such transactions.
17
The effect of the pern/-Rand decision on future litigation is
uncertain. The most that can be said is that one court has con-
sidered the adoption of a "primary capacity and use" standard
of classification, and has rejected it, but with the express stipu-
lation that such a test might be considered under other circum-
stances. A "primary capacity and use" test would seem to be
fundamentally more equitable than a mere "use" criterion, since
the occupational status or "capacity" of the user is the real
determinant of the exact use to which the goods are put.
The Review Committee for Article Nine has proposed that the
exemption from filing provision for farm equipment under Sec-
tion 9-302 be eliminated entirely.'8 This would seem to be the
most expedient solution to the matter, since it would eliminate
the borderline "equipment"--"farm equipment" controversy. The
fact remains, however, that the "primary use" test continues to
16. 456 S.W2d at 275.
17. Bunn, Financing Farmers: Eislitng Wisconsin Law, the Green Giant
Case, and the Uniforn Commercial Code, 1954 Wis. L. REv. 357.
18. 7 UCC REP. Sm. 6 (August 5, 1970).
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be the standard for classification under the Uniform Commer-
cial Code.19
EDWAM R. CoLE
19. See the South Carolina Reporter's Comments to S.C. CoDz ANN. § 10.9-
109 (Supp. 1966), which provide in part: "[T]he crucial test as to which of
the classes the goods would fall into would depend upon their primary use at
any given point of time." The pertinent sections of the Texas Business and
Commercial Code, notes 3 and 9 supra, are identical to those of the South
Carolina Version of the UmroRm Co0mCRL CoD found in the S.C. CoDE
ANN. §§ 10.9-109 and 9-302(1) (c) (Supp. 1966).
21
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